We are grateful to participants at the Financial Management Association Conference in Reno, 2009, for their helpful comments on this paper. The usual caveats with respect to errors and omissions apply.
I Introduction
It is well-known that value stocks have higher returns than glamour stocks (Lakonishok Shleifer and Vishny, 1994) , and this paper investigates whether corporate insiders recognise these return differences as mis-pricings and trade on them. Our study examines the patterns of, and the long run returns to, directors' trades along the value/glamour continuum, in order to assess whether directors are able to generate abnormal profits by trading on perceived market mis-valuations. 1 The premise is that company directors, with their in-depth knowledge of corporate affairs, can form a better assessment of the true long run value of their firm than the market. If so, they should trade in the opposite direction to any perceived market mis-valuations in general, and any mis-valuations along the value/glamour continuum in particular, so generating abnormal returns from their trades if and when such mis-valuations are eventually corrected.
If corporate insiders are following a naïve contrarian strategy then we would not expect them to outperform on a risk or style adjusted basis. Jenter (2005) finds that although corporate insiders in the US do act as contrarians, and are more likely to buy value stocks and sell glamour stocks, there are no excess returns to these strategies when appropriate size and value benchmarks are included. He concludes that his results are consistent with Lakonishok and Lee (2001) that in the US there are no abnormal returns to corporate insider trading.
However, Lakonishok and Lee have a somewhat different interpretation of their results, claiming that firms with intensive insider buying activity outperform companies with extensive sale activity, although they acknowledge that development of a profitable trading strategy is "not straightforward" given that the differences in returns are concentrated in smaller stocks.
These findings on the weak stock market response to corporate insider transactions in the US are in contrast to the UK where various studies have shown there are significant short run and 1 Throughout this paper we use the term directors to refer to both executive and non-executive board members long-run abnormal returns to directors' trading (Fidrmuc et al., 2006; Gregory et al., 1997) . Fidrmuc et al. (2006) explain the greater informativeness of UK directors' trades in terms of the regulatory differences between the two markets, in particular because required insider trading dissemination to the market is faster in the UK, and because the essence of US regulation is to require frequent public disclosures of private information. We would expect that these same regulatory differences to also impact on long-run returns, with the implication that directors trades in the UK may be more informative about a company's long-run stock market performance than in the US. We note, however, that since 2002 the Sarbanes-Oxley Act has changed US insider trading reporting requirements, so that the US position is now roughly in line with that of the UK. It may therefore be the case that post 2002, long-run returns to US insider trades will change to more closely resemble those in the UK. Thus our paper also provides a motivation for future US research to revisit the long run returns to insiders' trades in the light of the Sarbanes-Oxley changes.
The contribution of this paper is to investigate first whether directors in UK companies act as contrarian investors: buying in value stocks and selling in glamour stocks; and second whether the documented returns to corporate insider trading are related to insiders simply exploiting the value premium, variously defined, or whether there are incremental returns to insider trading implying that corporate insiders are trading on private information. We go considerably further than the extant US studies in investigating whether directors trade in a contrarian fashion, by investigating alternative measures of "value" stocks. Specifically, we extend the work of Lakonishok and Lee (2001) and Jenter (2005) by assessing returns to directors' trading relative to cash-to-price (C/P), earnings-to-price (E/P) and dividend-toprice (D/P) in addition to the book-to-market (B/M) measure of value employed in those papers. We also improve on the computation of long-run returns in an event study framework where the event is the month of the announcement of the trade. Both Lakonishok and Lee (2001) and Jenter (2005) form portfolios based on cumulated past trades over a number of months.
We are able to exploit the documented faster dissemination of insider trades in the UK market (Fidrmuc et al, 2006) to apply an event study framework, which allows us to employ more precise return windows around directors' trades compared to studies which rely on forming portfolios based upon the previous period's insider trading activity. We produce a range of long-run return metrics including cumulative abnormal returns, skewness adjusted buy-and-hold returns, and calendar time returns. In addition to this general contribution to the understanding of directors' trading, this paper is the first to study long run returns to insider trading in value and glamour firms for the UK market, and in doing so fills a gap in the literature, contributing both to the existing literature on insider trading and also to the growing literature on value effects for international markets.
To summarize our results: we find evidence in the pattern of directors' trades that is consistent with a contrarian view of mis-valuation of value and glamour stocks. We show that corporate insiders in the UK appear to have the ability to generate abnormal returns over and above a simple contrarian strategy of buying value stocks and selling glamour stocks. If managers trade only on the basis of scaled price ratios then we should not see any abnormal performance once these have been controlled for. But, our evidence suggests that corporate insiders in UK firms make use of their private information not reflected in the metrics that are constructed from publicly available information.
In the next section we review the literature on the value premium and its relationship with studies of insider trading, allowing us to develop our hypotheses. In Section III we explain the methodology, and Section IV describes the data set on UK corporate insider trades over the period [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] . We present the results in Section V, and Section VI provides our conclusions.
I Literature Review and Development of Hypotheses
Contrarian investment as an investment strategy has existed at least for the past 70 years, 2 but confirmation of its existence was in large part due to the work of Fama and French (1992 , 1993 and Lakonishok et al. (1994) . 3 Fama and French (1998) show that the value premium is a truly international phenomenon with twelve out of the thirteen countries in their comparative study, exhibiting a positive value-glamour spread. Some authors (Kothari et al., 1995; Black, 1993) and MacKinlay, 1995) ) have argued that these observed premiums are artefacts of the methodology adopted, due to survivorship bias, beta mis-measurement, data snooping and is sample-specific, However the wealth of international evidence would discount this argument. The "value" effect has been observed in Japan (Chan et al. 1991) , in
European countries (Capaul et al., 1993 and Brouwer et al., 1997) and in the UK by Levis and Liodakis (1999), Gregory et al. (2001) and Dimson et al. (2003) .
The interpretation of the value premium is contentious, and there are two commonly accepted, but conflicting, explanations. One is a rational explanation, which is that the value premium is only a compensation for risk (Fama and French, 1998) , and since value stocks are fundamentally riskier than glamour stocks (Zhang, 2005) , they therefore deliver greater returns as compensation for bearing that risk. The second explanation is based on the irrational behavioural of investors (Lakonishok et al., 1994) . The central idea behind this school of thought is that investors systematically overestimate the potential of the growth firms to produce superior returns and these systematic errors are responsible for the superior performance of the value stocks.
There are other reasons to believe that managers may engage in such contrarian strategies.
There is evidence from the corporate finance literature on the relationship between market mis-valuations and corporate events like IPOs, mergers, SEOs and share repurchases and managers adopting strategies to take advantage of these mis-valuations 4 . If these events are motivated at least in part by their beliefs on the market's valuation or mis-valuation then it is 3 These papers elaborated on the ideas and evidence uncovered by previous researchers including Stattman (1980) and Rosenberg et al.(1985) on the relation between cross section of returns and the B/M, and by Basu(1983) on the importance of the E/P in explaining returns.
entirely plausible that they will trade strategically when trading on their own accounts in their companies' stocks 5 . So an analysis of insider trading patterns across value and glamour firms provides interesting prima facie evidence on whether or not "value" firms are so priced because they are simply riskier, in which case we would not expect to see directors trading any differently between value and glamour categories, or whether such pricing (at least in the case of the sub-group of firms in which insiders trade) looks like mis-valuation.
If glamour firms genuinely underperform and value firms outperform in the long run, then we might expect corporate insiders with their insider knowledge to trade to take advantage of any perceived mis-valuation: managers would buy shares to take advantage of the future out performance of the value stocks and sell shares to avoid the underperformance of the glamour stocks. However, buying value stocks and selling glamour stocks would be a simple contrarian strategy which one might expect to see taking place in the absence of any information on insider trades. Whether such strategies generate genuine abnormal returns, net of any risk effects, is controversial. The research question that we answer is whether a directors' trading strategy is capable of generating abnormal returns over and above those that might accrue to a simple value-glamour contrarian strategy. Rozeff and Zaman (1998), Lakonishok and Lee (2001) and Jenter (2005) all find that corporate insiders tend to be net purchasers of value stocks. Rozeff and Zaman (1998) examine open market purchases and sales by insiders in a sample of US companies for the period 1978-1991, defining firms as value or glamour based on the CF/P ratio and the B/M ratio. They find that managers in growth firms tend to sell more equity than managers in value firms, and that insider buy trades are positively related to the CF/P and B/M ratios.
These findings are consistent with the overreaction hypothesis, as the insider trading is in the opposite direction to market prices i.e. insider selling glamour stocks and buying more value stocks.
Jenter (2005) extends Rozeff and Zaman (1998) using data for 1993 to 2000 period in two ways. First, by controlling for non-information related trading such as stock and option grants and levels of stockholdings. Second, by examining the relationship between equity issues and insider trading, and the effect of valuation ratios on this relationship. Jenter (2005) documents that managers in low B/M, E/P and CF/P ratios sell off shares "more frequently and aggressively" than managers in firms with high values for these ratios, and concludes that the risk compensation argument is not consistent with his evidence, since it is unlikely that company executives as sophisticated contrarian investors would be loading up on a risk factor.
Lakonishok and Lee (2001) conclude from their analysis of corporate insider trading that it unlikely that a risk pricing explanation is correct. They note that "it is hard to imagine that companies with extensive insider purchases are substantially riskier in the first year following the trading than they are in the second year".
From the discussion above, in relation to the relative quantity of insider trading in value and glamour firms the following hypothesis can be formulated. holdings from the previous fiscal year, and there may be severe delays from the time of the trade to the beginning of the measurement of the returns. Fidrmuc et al. (2006) find significant short-run stock price reaction to directors' trading in the UK, and suggest that U.K. insider trades are likely to be more informative on the announcement day and trigger larger market reactions than U.S. trades because: (i) the speed of reporting an insider trade and the speed at which the trade is disseminated into the public domain is much faster in the UK than in the US (up to 6 days versus up to 40 days), so that insider trading information is potentially stale in the US market; (ii) the definition of insiders in the US include a much wider group, and may include many non-informed traders; and (iii) the essence of UK regulations is to impose trading bans during price-sensitive periods whereas the essence of US regulations is to require frequent public disclosures, so that in the US there may be less private information for corporate insiders to trade on.
H1
In addition these regulations also affect the appropriate research design in a study of long-run returns, since the slower dissemination of insider trades in the US cause Lakonishok and Lee We argue that a conventional "event study" approach is likely to be more revealing than the Lakonishok and Lee (2001) net purchase ratio portfolio approach in a UK context, and indeed will be more informative for US trades post Sarbanes-Oxley. The dispersion of financial year end dates is more diverse in the UK than the US 6 , and given that the presence of proscribed trading periods could result in the clustering of trades, we concentrate on the calculation of calendar time abnormal returns in our study.
Given the evidence from the literature on the value premium one should also see the returns to trades in value firms generating higher abnormal returns in comparison to returns to trades in glamour firms even after size effects and book-to-market effect have been allowed for in the risk pricing models. These observations leads to our second hypothesis:
H2. If corporate insiders utilise more than a naïve contrarian strategy, then insider buy trades should generate higher positive long-run returns than their value-controlled
benchmarks and their sell trades should generate more negative long-run returns than their value-controlled benchmarks.
III Methodology
The objective of this paper is to study the long run returns to insider trades in value and glamour firms. Since the focus is on long run returns, this requires that the methodologies we use to calculate the abnormal returns to the directors trades are robust to the problems of estimation and inference of long-run returns. We follow the recommendation in Lyon et al approach we use the skewness adjusted bootstrapped t-test (Lyon et al, 1999) . The choice of benchmarking is very important in long run event studies. Ang and Zhang (2004) show that the Fama-French three factor model is well-specified and has reasonable power to detect abnormal returns at shorter horizons. Importantly, they show that inferences drawn using the weighted least squares (WLS) approach demonstrate superior performance to a simple OLS approach. They also show that the four-factor Carhart model performs considerably less well in their simulations. Accordingly, we follow the advice in Ang and Zhang (2004) and employ a FF-CTAR methodology with inferences drawn using WLS.
Companies with high dividend yields have been shown to outperform companies with low dividend yields. Levis (1989) show that for the UK there is a strong correlation between D/P and the average monthly return. This result is also corroborated by Morgan and Thomas, Hence one might hypothesise that sectional sorts on dividends yield may give rise to a value indicator with expected returns characteristics similar to those for the CF/P and E/P ratios, although dividends cannot take on a negative value. Nonetheless, there is still something of a problem with regard to this zero-yield sub-set of firms. At one level, one might associate zero-dividend stocks with "glamour" firm characteristics. However, Dimson (2003, p.40) note that throughput the period since 1955, the category of non dividend paying stocks has included many small UK companies with value characteristics. The sub-set will also include firms which have cut their dividends to zero. As such, expectations of future returns to this sub-set following directors' purchases are unclear. One approach, that could also be applied to the problem of negative book equity, cash flow, and earnings stocks, would be to follow the recent innovation in Brown et al. (2007) and allocate such firms to portfolios based upon a procedure similar to that used to classify mutual funds. We do not do this here, choosing instead to follow the more conventional approach used widely in the literature, and simply exclude such firms from our analysis. However, we note that directors' trading in such stocks may form an interesting analysis in its own right.
Benchmark portfolio construction
We use benchmark or reference portfolios in our BHAR tests, and these are formed on a size We follow Gregory et al. (2001) for the construction of the size and B/M benchmark portfolios. Each year, we first sort the firms on the market capitalisation in January each year.
We then use 50 th percentile of the market capitalisation of the largest 350 firms to separate the firms into small and large firms. This attempts to follow the spirit of the Fama and
French design for the US, whereby break points are formed using NYSE stocks only. intersection of these two independent sorts. These portfolios are then used to form the FamaFrench factors for the UK. In addition, the event firms are then allocated to the appropriate control group each year. This procedure results in six groups of firms. For our analysis, we drop the two middle-value groups and concentrate on the four remaining ones, namely a small-glamour group (Q SG ), a small-value group (Q SV ), large-glamour group (Q LG ), and a large-value group (Q LV ).
Whilst we follow Gregory et al (2001) , there are several methodologies adopted by various (2002) use sequential sorts. Sequential sorts results in the same number of stocks within each size group where as independent sort need not necessarily yield similar size groups. However, the most important issue in this regard is the setting of the break points for size and B/M. Fama and French (1993) use the NYSE break points of 50% of the market capitalisation to set the break points to create the size groups and 30%and 70% of the B/M to set the break points to further create the B/M groups. Miles and Timmermann (1996) , Liu et al. (1999) and Fletcher and Forbes (2002) 
IV Data
We examine directors trading in UK public limited companies undertaken in the period 1986-2003, with returns being accumulated for 24 months post-trade and for up to 6 months pretrade. We only consider open market purchases and sales of common stock. We eliminate trivial trades by removing trades where the absolute value of the net shares traded per month is less than £20,000 10 . We also exclude investment in AIM stocks and other unlisted securities from the analysis. We also do not consider directors trades in investment trusts, property firms, insurance companies and banks, which is consistent with Gregory et al. (2001) and Dimson et al. (2003) . The directors' trading data which includes the trades of both executive and non-executive directors, is from Hemmington Scott for periods post 1995, but before that are from the Gregory et al. (1997) dataset. Accounting data is from Hemmington Scott, supplemented with data from Datastream. All stock return data and market capitalisation data is from the LSPD. We cross check all the data when merging across different data sources to ensure consistency in the calculation of the relevant variables.
One unique feature of this data set is that it includes firms that have become void during the period 1985-2006, thereby eliminating survivorship bias. The effect of survivorship bias is that it results in higher returns and better performance because only firms that are successful enough to survive are included. Nagel (2001) identifying companies when merging the data across these different sources. These returns are all adjusted for dividends and capital structure changes.
Over the sample period there are 16,848 directors' transactions (defined as monthly net purchases or sales), 54% of those being directors' buys and 46% being directors' sales in terms on the number of transactions (see Table 1 ). However, in terms of both the number and value of shared traded, directors' sales account for a higher percentage than directors' purchases. For the B/M value indicator, we initially investigate trading patterns and returns by simply classifying firms on the basis of B/M quintiles. Table 2 shows the means and medians of the various insider trading measures by these B/M quintile. We can see that there is a clear pattern, in the value of the net trades as we move from glamour (Q 1G ) to value (Q 5V ) groups, with negative net trades (sales) in the glamour portfolio, and positive net trades (purchases) in the value group. This is due to both increase in the value of buys and decrease in the value of sells as we move from glamour to value group. For example, directors' in the extreme glamour group are net sellers with an average trade value of £533,000, while they are net buyers in the extreme value group with an average trade value of £104,000. Other measures of directors' trading like the net purchase ratio (npr), net number ratio (npn) and net value ratio (npv) all exhibit this same pattern. This is consistent with the hypothesis that directors take a contrarian view on the value of their own firm. What is particularly striking is that whichever measure of trading activity we employ, net purchase activity increases monotonically as we move through the glamour to value continuum.
V Results
We start with a simple quintile allocation of stocks on a glamour-value continuum. In general, the six months pre-event returns (not reported in the tables) are negative, implying that directors buy after a fall in prices. The post bid returns from the FF_CTARs are then shown in Table 3 . Our quintiles are numbered from Q1 (glamour) to Q5 (value). Strikingly, we see that for all horizons, abnormal returns are earned in the two "value portfolios following directors' purchases. Returns are not significantly different from zero following purchases in the "glamour" portfolios. These returns carry through to 24 months after purchase, although the highest annual percentage rates (APRs) are after 6 months, where the annualised return on the Q5 portfolio is 13.22% and that on the Q4 portfolio is 11.48%.
These APRs progressively tail off to 9.51% and 11.88% respectively after 12 months, and 7.31% and 10.03% respectively after 24 months. On the "sell" side, abnormal returns are small and insignificant in all cases.
So far, our results are consistent with those from other studies, in that in general positive returns accrue to directors' trades in the longer run, and that directors' purchasing and selling patterns seem to be contrarian in nature. Directors sell more glamour stocks than value stocks and buy more value stocks, with net trades showing a clear pattern of contrarian trading, and they tend to sell following prices rises and buy following price falls. We now extend our analysis to firms partitioned on the basis of both size and book-to-market ratios Table 4 reports the directors' trade statistics for the different size and value-glamour portfolios. We see that value of the net trades increase as we move from the glamour to value categories and the other measures of insider trading also show the contrarian nature of the directors' trades. As one moves from the small-glamour to the small-value portfolios, we see a change consistent with the contrarian nature of the directors trading in that insiders become less likely to be net sellers. The median value of the trades show that insiders go from being net sellers (£34,000) to being net buyers (£23,500). We see a similar pattern for the large group of companies. Based on the median values insiders go from being net sellers (£12,200) in large-glamour firms to net buyers (£19,500) in large-value firms. The npn, npr and npv measures present a similar picture.
Size and B/M benchmark portfolios
Again, the crucial question is whether this apparently contrarian trading behaviour is borne out by the future returns to these trades. Table 5 shows the BHARS to buy trades based on value weighted returns of the size and B/M benchmark portfolios. We emphasise that by construction, these event time portfolios have been cleaned of any simple "value-glamour" effects, and so there returns can be viewed as net of any style or risk effects. Directors generally buy after negative abnormal returns (the one exception being small value stocks, where pre-purchase abnormal returns are not significant), and these negative abnormal returns are followed by significant reversals in the post-trade period. They always sell after significant increases in abnormal returns, although the reversal effect here only occurs in the case of large value stocks. In every case, on the purchase portfolio their trades generate significant positive abnormal returns in excess of any pure "value-glamour" effect. However, the buy and hold abnormal returns for buy trades show a big differential between the abnormal returns generated by value and glamour firms within both the small and large categories. On a value weighted basis we find that directors' buy trades generate abnormal returns of 12.65% and 20.01% for small-glamour and small-value firms after 24 months, compared to 3.74% and 6.29% for large-glamour and large-value firms. With respect to the sell trades in large-value firms we observe that the BHAR is -8.47% after 24 months, and a significant -4.06% on the (0, +18) month holding period. It is also worthwhile noting that the proportion of positive return events go from 54.3% to 39.4% as we go from the (-6,0) to the (0,24) window.
However, the calendar-time portfolio regressions reported in Table 6 show that only buy trades in small-value and large value firms generate consistently significant positive abnormal returns. The abnormal returns observed with the glamour firms when using the event-time approaches seem to disappear entirely in calendar-time. The abnormal returns are roughly twice as large in the case of small value stocks compared to large value stocks, and again the annualised returns are strongest over the 6 month window, where small value stock trades earn 13.62% compared to large value stock trades of 6.04%. After 24 months these annualised rates fall away to 9.51% and 4.91% respectively. The calendar time returns confirm that directors' sales as a whole generate returns that are simply insignificant. These results are consistent with findings elsewhere, which as a whole suggest directors tend to sell for liquidity and portfolio re-balancing reasons.
The difference in returns using the event time and calendar-time approaches has implications for pseudo market timing. Chan et al. (2007 Chan et al. ( , p.2675 ) note that to the extent that any post announcement abnormal returns are observed, the critical distinguishing inference of pseudo market timing is that one continues to observe abnormal performance in event time but not under calendar-time. Our results with regard to value stocks are supportive of the notion that directors seem to have genuine (as opposed to pseudo) market timing ability. This is consistent with the evidence on UK IPOs reported in Gregory et al (2008) .
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In summary, we see that when B/M ratio is used as a indicator of value, on a size adjusted basis value firms in which directors buy consistently outperform their benchmark firms. On a size and B/M adjusted basis, we find that the really robust result holds only for buy trades in small-value and large-value companies. This suggests that insiders in such firms use more than a naïve contrarian strategy at least with respect to their buy trades.
Other measures of Over/Undervaluation
As discussed earlier several other accounting-based variables have been suggested as alternatives to B/M for identifying value stocks. Earnings yield (E/P), Cash flow yield (CF/P), and Dividend yield (D/P) have received the most attention in empirical studies. One argument is that these variables, along with B/M, are all highly correlated with one another, and they produce a similar dispersion in average returns. However, several studies have shown that this is not always the case. In the Appendix, we also report the correlations between the various valuation ratios to check this. Although the correlations are significant, they clearly indicate considerable variation between value categories, hence justifying a concern with alternative specifications of value classification.
We consider each of the valuation ratios in turn starting with the CF/P ratio. Table 7 reports trade characteristics for four size and CF/P groups. Here we see that, as we move within the small group of companies, the percentage of buys and sells change from 43% and 57% to 62% and 37% respectively. Within the large group of large companies we see a similar pattern. The percentage of buys and sells change from 47% and 53% to 62% and 38%
respectively. Alternatively, if we consider measures relating to the number of shares traded and the value of the shares traded we find that as we move from Q SG to Q SV the median value of the net shares traded changes from £25,200 (net sales) to 20,800 (net purchases), while within the group of large companies the corresponding values change from £15,268 (net sales) to £20,240 (net purchases). Thus, as in the case of the B/M ratio, we observe that directors adopt a contrarian approach when trading in their own firms.
When we consider the CTARs from the FF3F model, again on the buy side, the really striking result is that of the out performance of the small-value firms. Over 6 months, these firms
show an annualised abnormal return of 13.49%. Large value stocks also out-perform, though to a lesser extent, with 6-month annualised returns of 5.66% falling to an annualised rate of 4.91% after 24 months. Note though, that there is an implicit benchmark difference between the FF3F model (which controls for "value" effects using HML, based on book-to-market ratios) and the value strategy being followed. There is some underperformance on the sell side for large-glamour firms, which is significant at the 10% level only, but a curiosity is that large value stocks actually show evidence of being marginally significantly positive at the 6 month horizon, although the effect is not found for any other holding period.
Next we consider the results based on E/P ratio as the measure of value. Table 9 reports the characteristics for the trades partitioned on the basis of size and E/P. We find that within the group of small companies the percentage of directors' purchases and sales change from 43%
and 57% to 49% and 56%, as we move from the glamour to the value groups. For the large firms this changes to 49% and 56% and 43% respectively. Again, we find that insiders are contrarian in that they buy more in value firms and sell more in glamour firms. The table
shows that as we move from Q SG (small-glamour) to Q SV (small-value), the value of the net shares traded changes from a median of £13,825 net sales to £18,774 net purchases. For the large firms this changes from £11,405 net sales to £4,000 net purchases.
Once again, the calendar-time abnormal returns in Table 10 show that it is the purchases in the small-value firms that exhibit the strongest outperformance. Annualised abnormal returns following directors' purchases are 11.62% after 6 months, 11.09% after one year, and 8.34%
after two years. For large value stocks, the effects are somewhat weaker, and only significant at the 10% level at up to a 12 month horizon. Nonetheless, over a two year period these large value stock trades out-perform by an annualised rate of 4.03%. On the sell side with the calendar-time portfolio regressions we do not see any underperformance of the value firms
and indeed there appears to be significant outperformance at short horizons. However, there is no evidence of any abnormal performance for any sub-group at longer horizons.
Having discussed the E/P ratio we can now move on to the results using D/P or the dividend yield as a measure of value. Table 11 reports various directors' trade related statistics for the six groups. For the number of transactions we observe 40% and 60% buys and sells in the small-glamour group, which changes to 65% and 34% for the small-value group. For the large group we find that the corresponding numbers are 41% and 59% and changing to 67% and 32%. So again there seems to be a strong contrarian trend with respect to the number of transactions. In terms of the values of the net shares traded we observe that the median value changes from £33,126(net sales) to £ 22,500 (net purchases) as we move from glamour to value within the small category and from £26,093 (net sales) to £24,514 (net purchases).
Therefore, the pattern for D/P is similar to that which we have seen for all the other value to price ratios.
The FF-CTAR returns reported in Table 12 differ from those in the earlier tables, in that persistent abnormal returns are now found only for the small value firm group. Six monthly abnormal returns for this group reach 14.03% per annum, becoming 12.55% p.a. after 12 months and 9.38% p.a. over 24 months. Trades in large value firms show little evidence of being significant, the exception being at the 24 month horizon where annualised returns reach 4.03%. Returns on the sell side confirm that directors' sales appear to convey little information.
VI Conclusions
Our first results confirm that, similar to the US findings of Jenter (2005) and Lakonishok and Lee (2001), UK directors trade as contrarians. We then go on to show that UK directors' purchases generate long run abnormal returns over and above a simple value-glamour trading rule for value portfolios. These abnormal returns increase monotonically as we move along the glamour-value continuum. The particular contribution of this paper is to analyse specifically what directors' trades add to a "naïve" value-glamour strategy. We do this by controlling for different definitions of "value" in our benchmark portfolios, so that directors' trades are evaluated net of the value-glamour effect. Having considered various ratios as candidates for defining "value" stocks, we find the consistent result from both event time and calendar time methods, no matter how "value" is defined, is that directors' purchases in small-value firms generate significant abnormal returns, after allowing for size and alternative value/glamour effects in the benchmarks. These abnormal returns persist for over two-years after the initial directors' trade. Small-glamour firms do not show superior performance in calendar time, in contrast to the result obtained by Lakonishok and Lee (2001) for the US. For the B/M and C/P definitions of "value", we also show that directors' trades in large value stocks also generate abnormal returns over an above a simple valueglamour trading rule. Given that in all cases these returns are those in excess of the returns on a size and valuation ratio matched benchmark portfolio, these returns reflect the fact that directors indeed use more than a naïve contrarian strategy when trading in their companies' stock.
Our calendar time returns measure outperformance relative to the Fama-French factors, which explicitly assume that book-to-market and size are proxies for risk. On this basis, the abnormal returns to small value stocks are similar and always highly significant across differing "value" categories. Six month annual percentage rates (APRs) are always highest, ranging between 11.62% for the E/P basis to 14.03% on a D/P one, with a 12 month APR ranging from 11.09% (E/P) to 12.55% (D/P) and a 24 month abnormal return varying between 8.34% (C/P) and 9.51% (B/M). For the large value group, abnormal returns are flatter through time, and whilst generally not significant for D/P range between a significant 6.04% p.a.(B/M) down to a marginally significant 4.91% p.a. for E/P after 6 months. Over a 24 month horizon, the abnormal returns range between 4.03% p.a. (E/P and D/P) to 4.91%
(C/P, B/M). Whilst trading costs clearly vary between small and large firms, there is no reason to suppose that such costs vary between value and glamour firms within a particular size category. Our evidence for these small value stocks backs up the Lakonishok and Lee (2001) interpretation that insiders who buy such stocks "know what they are doing", and given the lower transactions costs on large firms, one might reasonably reach a similar conclusion for large value stocks too.
Taken as a whole, our results confirm those from previous research in that directors' trading signals clearly generate significant positive abnormal returns on the "buy" side, and smaller but insignificant negative returns on the "sell" side. The important results in this paper are to first to show that these returns remain even after controlling for varying definitions of "value"
and "glamour", but also to provide corroborating evidence from outside the US that larger abnormal returns are concentrated in smaller value stocks in particular. This Table reports the number of trades, the number of shares traded and the value of shares traded for the 1986-2003 period. In panel A the number of trades is the after aggregating the buys and sells and then reclassifying the transactions for each firm for each month. The Grand Total row shows the total number of trades, the total number of shares traded and the total value of shares traded for Buys and Sells together. The Percent row shows the number of trades, no of shares traded or the value of shares traded, as a percentage of the grand total. This table reports the means and median for various directors' trading related measures for the different groups formed on the basis of the B/M ratio. Q1 and Q2 are the glamour group, Q4 and Q5 are the value groups. npr, npn and npv are net purchase ratio, net number ratio, and the net value ratio. npr is calculated as (no. of Purchases -no. of Sales)/ (no. of Purchases+ no. of Sales), npn and npv are calculated similarly, but using number of shares traded and the value of shares traded. Nonet is the net number of shares traded. Valnet is the net value of the shares traded. 
Glamour or Value defined by the B/M ratio

Group
. The SMB is the returns to a small minus big factor mimicking portfolio, the HML is the returns to high B/M minus low B/M factor mimicking portfolio. The OLS-t is a heteroskedasticity corrected (using white's procedure) t-statistic. Q1 and Q2 are the glamour groups, Q4 and Q5 are the value groups. The symbols *,**, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% and levels, respectively, for the two-tailed hypothesis test that the coefficient equals zero.
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Buys Sells 
. The SMB is the returns to a small minus big factor mimicking portfolio, the HML is the returns to high B/M minus low B/M factor mimicking portfolio. The OLS-t is a heteroskedasticity corrected (using white's procedure) t-statistic. Q SG is the small glamour group, Q SV is the small value group, Q LG is the large glamour group and Q LV is the large value group formed on the basis of their size and the B/M ratios. The symbols *,**, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% and levels, respectively, for the two-tailed hypothesis test that the coefficient equals zero. 
. The SMB is the returns to a small minus big factor mimicking portfolio, the HML is the returns to high B/M minus low B/M factor mimicking portfolio. The OLS-t is a heteroskedasticity corrected (using white's procedure) t-statistic. Q SG is the small glamour group, Q SV is the small value group, Q LG is the large glamour group and Q LV is the large value group formed on the basis of their size and the CF/P ratios. The symbols *,**, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% and levels, respectively, for the two-tailed hypothesis test that the coefficient equals zero. This table reports the means and median for various directors' trading related measures for the different groups formed on the basis of size and the E/P ratio. Q SG are small glamour firms, Q SV are small value firms, Q LG are large glamour firms and Q LV are large value firms. npr, npn and npv are net purchase ratio, net number ratio, and the net value ratio. npr is calculated as (no. of Purchases -no. of Sales)/ (no. of Purchases+ no. of Sales), npn and npv are calculated similarly, but using number of shares traded and the value of shares traded. Nonet is the net number of shares traded. Valnet is the net value of the shares traded. . The SMB is the returns to a small minus big factor mimicking portfolio, the HML is the returns to high B/M minus low B/M factor mimicking portfolio. The OLS-t is a heteroskedasticity corrected (using white's procedure) t-statistic. Q SG is the small glamour group, Q SV is the small value group, Q LG is the large glamour group and Q LV is the large value group formed on the basis of their size and the E/P ratios. The symbols *,**, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% and levels, respectively, for the two-tailed hypothesis test that the coefficient equals zero.
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Buys . The SMB is the returns to a small minus big factor mimicking portfolio, the HML is the returns to high B/M minus low B/M factor mimicking portfolio. The OLS-t is a heteroskedasticity corrected (using white's procedure) t-statistic. Q SG is the small glamour group, Q SV is the small value group, Q LG is the large glamour group and Q LV is the large value group formed on the basis of their size and the D/P ratios. The symbols *,**, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% and levels, respectively, for the two-tailed hypothesis test that the coefficient equals zero.
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